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In an effort to deliver better outcomes for people and the eco-
systems they depend on, many governments and civil society
groups are engaging natural resource users in collaborative man-
agement arrangements (frequently called comanagement). How-
ever, there are few empirical studies demonstrating the social and
institutional conditions conducive to successful comanagement
outcomes, especially in small-scale fisheries. Here, we evaluate 42
comanagement arrangements across five countries and show that:
(i) comanagement is largely successful at meeting social and ecolog-
ical goals; (ii) comanagement tends to benefit wealthier resource
users; (iii) resource overexploitation is most strongly influenced by
market access and users’ dependence on resources; and (iv) institu-
tional characteristics strongly influence livelihood and compliance
outcomes, yet have little effect on ecological conditions.
common property | governance | human–environment interaction |
institutional design principles | common-pool resources
The perceived failure of many open-access and top-down gov-ernment approaches to managing common-pool resources has
inspired a shift in governance toward community-based coman-
agement arrangements that provide local people with a greater
say in the allocation and use of their resources (1). Comanage-
ment is thought to help make resource management initiatives
more legitimate in the eyes of stakeholders and more reflective of
local conditions, creating better incentives for people to comply
with rules on their own accord (2, 3). In the context of small-scale
fisheries, which support the livelihoods of some 200million people,
comanagement arrangements can be successful at sustaining
resources and improving livelihoods of resource users (Fig. 1) (1, 4,
5). However, comanagement can also create new incentives for
overexploitation, exacerbate existing social inequalities, and lead to
other undesirable social and ecological outcomes (3, 6–9). Critical
questions remain about what communities, donors, and policy-
makers can do to promote desirable comanagement outcomes.
Contextual conditions such as poverty, dependence on resour-
ces, and access to markets influence whether people successfully
manage or overexploit common-pool resources (10–12). In addi-
tion, specific institutional characteristics, known as design princi-
ples, are thought to increase the likelihood of sustained collective
action by creating conditions that encourage users to cooperate
with common property institutions (10). These principles include
graduated sanctions (punishments that increase with the fre-
quency and severity of infringements), clearly defined boundaries,
collective choice rules (where users can participate in decision-
making processes to change rules), and conflict resolution mech-
anisms, among others (10, 13, 14). To date, previous empirical
studies have not tended to evaluate the potential role of specific
institutional designs in achieving successful comanagement out-
comes (15).
Here, we examine how social and ecological outcomes are
related to key institutional design and socioeconomic covariates
in 42 coral reef fishery comanagement arrangements across Kenya,
Tanzania, Madagascar, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea (Fig. 2
and SI Appendix, Table S1). We used Ostrom’s diagnostic frame-
work for analyzing social-ecological systems (4, 11, 16) to guide
our study design (SI Appendix, Fig. S1 and Table S1). Using a
combination of underwater visual census of reef fishes and
semistructured interviews with >1,000 resource users and local
leaders (SI Appendix), we quantified the relative importance of
household and community-scale factors influencing three in-
dependent comanagement outcomes. These outcomes were as
follows: (i) perceived impacts of comanagement on livelihoods of
resource users; (ii) reported compliance with restrictions; and (iii)
the exploitation status of fishery resources (SI Appendix).
Results and Discussion
Comanaged fisheries generally perform well on all three measures
of success. In particular, 54%of resource users perceived beneficial
outcomes for their livelihoods; 88% reported that comanagement
arrangements were mostly or fully complied with; and comanaged
fisheries generally maintained a greater standing fish biomass than
fished areas lacking localmanagement (but, as expected, both were
considerablymore exploited thanmost no-take fisheries closures in
the same countries; Fig. 3 and SI Appendix). Our results are, how-
ever, not uniformly positive: There are cases where comanagement
has not achieved positive social or ecological outcomes. De-
termining how these poorly performing comanagement systems
can be improved requires a better understanding of how specific
social and ecological outcomes are associated with particular in-
stitutional and contextual conditions (11) (SI Appendix, Fig. S1).
We used a series of Bayesian-hierarchical models to quantify
relationships between the probability of successful comanagement
outcomes and the 22 household and community-scale covariates
(Fig. 4). For our metric of perceived livelihood impacts, we used
separate estimates to identify differences between the self-identi-
fied losers andwinners resulting from comanagement (Fig. 4A and
B). The most successful comanagement arrangements for the
livelihoods of users occur when key institutional designs are in
place; when knowledge about the role humans play in ecosystem
decline is high; where people have long been involved in co-
management; and when they are wealthier (Fig. 4 A and B and SI
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Appendix). This latter result suggests that despite the strong po-
tential for positive social and ecological outcomes, comanagement
can contribute to social inequity by creating opportunities for local
elites to control resources (6, 7, 17). By providing users with
a greater say in the allocation of resources, comanagement is likely
to involve a redistribution of access rights (18), and the wealthy
may be better poised to take advantage of these changes (17, 19).
There is no evidence, however, that comanagement is detrimental
to the livelihoods of the poor (Fig. 4B), who are oftenmarginalized
in other types of governance regimes in regards to resource allo-
cation and entitlements (19, 20). To ensure that comanagement
arrangements attain the levels of perceived equity and legitimacy
necessary for long-term success (3, 21), managersmust findways to
deliver beneficial livelihood outcomes to the poor. Delivering
these outcomes will require an equitable distribution of power (6,
Fig. 1. (A) Coral reefs support small-scale fisheries in many low-income, tropical nations. As with many other types of common-pool resources, reef fisheries
are often overexploited when effective institutions are not in place (10). (B) The complex and multispecies nature of small-scale reef fisheries, illustrated by
this harvest from Indonesia, makes them particularly difficult to effectively manage solely through top-down regulations, especially in the resource-deficient
context in which many tropical national fisheries agencies operate (1). (C) Comanagement arrangements that allow resource users to develop and enforce
locally appropriate rules about resource use, such as this periodically harvested fisheries closure from Papua New Guinea, can provide substantial benefits to
resource users, achieve high levels of compliance, and potentially lead toward more sustainable fisheries (24, 41). Photos by J.E.C.
Fig. 2. Map of study comanagement sites across the Indo-Pacific in Kenya
and Tanzania (1), Madagascar (2), Indonesia (3), and Papua New Guinea (4).
Orange dots indicate approximate locations of fishery comanagement sites.
Fig. 3. Comparison of standing biomass in no-take fisheries closures, coman-
aged fisheries, and sites with no local management. Levels of fish biomass are
demonstrably higher in comanaged areas {350 [265, 450] kg/ha; highest pos-
terior density (HPD) [95%uncertainty intervals (UI)], n = 27} than in comparable
open-access reef fisheries (177 [116, 261] kg/ha, n = 26), but no-take fishery
closures have the highest expected biomass (619 [417, 818] kg/ha, n = 16). HPD
and 95% UI are based on a (normal) Bayesian linear random-effects model for
log(biomass) given management status. Biomass data for no-take fishery clo-
sures and sites with no-local management are from parallel studies on the
ecological outcomes of different coral reefmanagement strategies in our study
countries (refs. 24 and 40 and SI Appendix).
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22) and, in some cases, may involve poverty reduction strategies,
such as the provision of microcredit loans (23).
Compliance is a continual challenge for many fisheries man-
agement andmarine conservation initiatives (21, 24). Institutional
design principles are thought to create conditions conducive to
cooperation in common property scenarios (10), and we found
that high levels of reported compliance are positively related to
graduated sanctions (Fig. 4C and SI Appendix). There is also
moderate evidence that reported compliance is higher when co-
management arrangements are further from markets, where
respondents are wealthier, and where they trust their leaders and
other community members (Fig. 4C). There are frequent calls to
establish territorial use rights that provide local resource users
with exclusive rights to their fishing grounds (4), but we found that
in a developing country comanagement context, compliance was
lowest under this type of restricted access arrangement (Fig. 4C).
Interviews with resource users revealed plausible explanations for
this seemingly counterintuitive result: (i) Several key informants
and respondents noted that membership (i.e., who had access
rights) became difficult to clearly define because of marriage
arrangements between members and nonmembers. In the context
of many of our study sites, access rights were determined by af-
filiation with specific social groupings (e.g., community or clan), as
opposed to a formal licensing arrangement. Interestingly, we did
not find that “clearly defined membership” (one of the in-
stitutional design principles) had a consistent effect on compli-
ance throughout the 42 sites, but respondents suggest that
confusion about membership may play an important role in some
local contexts; and (ii) Communities often lacked patrol boats or
systems of offshore surveillance to effectively enforce these types
of access rights. A number of users noted that by the time they
paddled or sailed out to enforce the access rights, infringers with
motorized boats had left. In addition to adequate enforcement
capacity, comanagement compliance is also about creating con-
ditions that are conducive to people cooperating (10, 21). Man-
agers and donors can help build the legitimacy, social capital, and
trust that foster cooperation by making targeted investments that
lead toward transparent and deliberative comanagement systems
(1, 3, 21, 22, 25).
The state of reef fishery resources is often assumed to be pri-
marily driven by Malthusian overfishing related to the size of
nearby human settlements (e.g., refs. 26 and 27). However, a key
finding from this study is that the exploitation status of coman-
aged fisheries is most strongly affected by access to markets and
levels of dependence on marine resources (Fig. 4D), providing
potential levers for policy action. Strategies that address the
complex linkages between ecosystems, local livelihoods, and
market access will be critical for sustainable fisheries co-
management (14, 28, 29). These strategies may include, for ex-
ample, livelihoods-focused approaches to poverty reduction (28)
and improved market governance through sustainable harvesting
certifications (29, 30).
This study models the influence of a range of institutional de-
sign principles on common property outcomes using primary data
across large geographic and social scales. A surprising finding is
that these institutional characteristics thought to influence the
sustainability of commons governance are strongly related to so-
cial, but not ecological, outcomes in the comanagement of small-
scale fisheries (Fig. 4). Critically, these design principles may help
people organize effectively and perceive benefits from collective
action (10), but they do not ensure that a given organization will
sustainably manage resources. Indeed, people may collectively
organize to exploit resources rather than to sustain them (9).
Consequently, organizing collective action for sustainability rather
than short-term exploitation may require an adaptive coman-
agement approach (31–33) that: (i) fosters learning about the
social-ecological system (34), (ii) incorporates local and scientific
knowledge systems (35), (iii) creates incentives for ecosystem
stewardship (36), and (iv) invests in multiscale governance
arrangements that network comanagement organizations and
foster key linkages with higher levels of social and political orga-
nization (10, 37).
Our study provides empirical evidence that comanagement
can help to sustain fisheries and the people that depend on them,
Fig. 4. Influence of social-ecological system attributes of reef-fishery comanagement outcomes across the 42 study sites in the Indo-Pacific. Parameter
estimates are Bayesian posterior median values and 95% UI for the 16 model-selected covariates (y axis) relating to the local social-economic and political
setting (S; orange); characteristics of resource users (U; yellow); and the governance system (GS; purple). The multinomial model provided separate estimates
for respondents that perceived positive and detrimental livelihood outcomes from comanagement. Responses include the following: perceived beneficial
livelihoods outcomes (A); perceived detrimental livelihood outcomes (B); reported compliance (C); and magnitude of observed fish biomass (kilograms per
hectare) (D). Positive response estimates are indicated in green; negative are indicated in red; and evidence of no effect is indicated in blue. Filled circles
indicate strong evidence of covariate effects; open circles denote estimates with an increased level of uncertainty as to their direction; green and red open
circles have >80% of their posterior density in either a positive or negative direction, respectively. These results are discussed in more detail in SI Appendix.
Response estimates are standardized to be directly comparable within each column and include both household and community-level covariates, modeled at
the appropriate scale. Missing variables occurred in models with no DIC-based support (SI Appendix). Asterisk indicates that, effect sizes are standardized
within each response relative to their mean divided by two times their SD.
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even in the social-ecological contexts most susceptible to failure:
artisanal, multispecies, coastal fisheries in low-income countries
(1). However, the likelihood of this happening is higher when
certain social, economic, and institutional conditions are in place.
Managers and donors can facilitate desirable comanagement
outcomes by working with resource users on context-dependent
strategies to improve livelihoods and governance, such as
dampening the negative influence of global markets, providing
equitable livelihood benefits, and strengthening local institutions
(10, 29, 38). These policy actions will be a substantial departure
from the norms of many fisheries managers, and implementing
them effectively will require forging partnerships with social
scientists, donors, financial institutions, and civil society (39).
Methods
Details are provided in SI Appendix.
We studied 42 independent comanagement arrangements spanning five
Indo-Pacific countries: Kenya, Tanzania, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and
Madagascar. We used purposive sampling to ensure variation in in-
dependent variables. To gather information and triangulate results in each
study site, we used a combination of household surveys, semistructured
interviews with key informants (community leaders, resource users, and
other stakeholders), underwater visual census, and analyses of secondary
sources such as population censuses (SI Appendix, Table S1). In total, we
conducted 960 resource user interviews, 53 key informant interviews, 54
community leader interviews, and 51 organizational leader interviews. Our
data collection provided information on three dependent variables (per-
ceived impact of comanagement on the livelihoods of users; perceived
levels of compliance, and reef fish biomass); and 22 covariate attributes
relating to the local governance system, the social, economic, and political
setting, and the socioeconomic characteristics of resource users in each
community (SI Appendix, Fig. S1 and Table S1). Additionally, fish biomass
data from comanaged sites were compared with 26 sites without local-level
management and 16 no-take fishery closures in our study countries (SI
Appendix). We used Ostrom’s diagnostic framework (11, 40) to build a se-
ries of Bayesian hierarchical models that quantify the relationship between
our 22 measured covariates and three dimensions of comanagement suc-
cess (SI Appendix, Table S3).
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